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April-June 2004
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Purgatorius magazine |
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A Compendium of Thoughts, Quotes, and Statistics About the War in Iraq
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Luc Nadeau, April 20 2004
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| Why did the Bush White House lead us into the current war in Iraq? The following compendium may not give us a definitive answer to this question, but it does make it evident that the reasons we were given as justifications for war were fronts for less justifiable reasons. I don’t believe that weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the threat of their imminent use, Iraqi ties to terrorism, or humanitarian efforts were the primary motivations for the war in Iraq. I believe that there is no simple reason for the war, but it is partially that the current White House seeks better control of resources (especially oil) throughout the world, with the added benefits that this gives to its corporate sponsors. WMDs were a convenient tool to win the support of Americans and, to a lesser degree, governments. Everybody knew that Saddam Hussein had possessed WMDs and that he wasn’t afraid to use them. But it was widely understood (even by those in the White House) that he no longer posed a serious threat, even to his neighbors, and inspections were containing the threat that he would | ||||
| one day rebuild his WMD arsenals. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction seems to be the source of much of the misinformation disseminated from the White House. The NIE itself overstated the case, and the White House exaggerated the strongest (and most dubious) statements in the NIE to induce the level of fear necessary to push the country into war. The White House ignored the more moderate statements and alternative views presented in the NIE, which clearly indicated that Iraq did not pose a serious or imminent threat to the United States. Maybe Bush, Blair, Powell, Rumsfeld, et al. did believe that they would find remnants of a WMD program, but they went out of their way to overstate the case in order to justify a war that had been in the making for over 10 years. | ||||
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And if the Iraq war is another stage in the War on Terrorism, is it achieving its goal? Worldwide terrorist acts have gone up since the War on Terrorism began. Do these people really want to stop terrorism? It is counterintuitive to think that invading other countries against the will of the people will deter terrorism. Why not use the hundred or so billion dollars spent on the war to build sustainable programs to help reduce poverty worldwide on a long-term basis? |
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| Why not put some of our considerable energy and resources into the formulation of more equitable policies in Israel/Palestine, the Middle East, and the world in general. And why are we spending so much money on fighting terrorism, when there are threats to Americans that are orders of magnitude greater – obesity is an apropos example (causing over 300,000 preventable deaths each year). U.S. deaths from bee stings each year (30-120) are comparable to the average number of Americans killed in the U.S. by terrorism over the last 34 years (93, including 9/11). This is not to make light of the abomination of terrorism, but to point out that we could save so many more lives by redirecting our resources. Terrorism probably will pose a greater threat in the future, especially through policies that create poverty, destitution, and anger throughout the world. These are the issues we must address.
In their own words, it should be evident that the justifications for war put forth by the White House were at the very least greatly exaggerated, and were more likely inventions and deceptions designed to manipulate the world into supporting a war that had been planned by many in the administration for a number of years. There certainly were numerous factors to justify the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, but nothing that justified unilateral action on the part of the United States. The world did not support this war, and the war’s undertaking has severely undermined the authority of the United Nations – unilateral action almost necessarily leads to despotism. If we want to promote democracy in the world, we should begin by adhering to the democratic tenets of the United Nations. Facts and FiguresSenate and House votes, respectively, authorizing President Bush to attack Iraq, October 2002: 77-23, 296-133 Percentage of President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address Given to Various Issues: 1% Afghanistan; 1.3% God; 2.3% Al Qaeda; 4.9% Energy and the Environment; 6% Healthcare and Medicare; 9.7% Economy, Tax Relief, Budget; 27.6% Iraq.[1] Number of civilians killed by Iraq in the U.S.: 0 Number of Iraqi civilians killed by military actions of the U.S. and its allies since the beginning of the current Iraq war as of April 17 2004: 8875-10725[2] U.S. and coalition soldiers killed since beginning of current Iraq war as of April 17 2004: 792[3] Civilians killed on U.S. soil from terrorism, 1970 through March 2004: 3155[4] Deaths due directly to U.S. atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima: 140,000[5] Deaths due directly to U.S. atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki: 73,884[6] Conservative estimate of number of non-combatant Iraqi Kurds killed by Iraqi forces, 1987-1989: 50,000[7] Date of end of diplomatic and military relations between the U.S. and Iraq: Aug 1, 1990[8] Average number of dark-skinned Sudanese currently being killed each week by Arab militants: 1000[9] Estimated number of people killed in the current conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Up to 4.7 million[10] Number of children under 5 who die each day worldwide: > 27,000[11] The Road to War“Once you've got Baghdad, it's not clear what you do with it. It's not clear what kind of government you would put in place of the one that's currently there now. Is it going to be a Shia regime, a Sunni regime or a Kurdish regime? …How much credibility is that government going to have if it's set up by the United States military when it's there? How long does the United States military have to stay to protect the people that sign on for that government, and what happens to it once we leave?” - Dick Cheney, then-Secretary of Defense, 1991 “I want to be the bully on the block… there is no future in trying to challenge the armed forces of the United States.” -Colin Powell, Secretary of State, 1992, speech to House Armed Services Committee “He [Saddam Hussein] has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors.” - Colin Powell, Feb 24 2001, press remarks in Cairo “Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again – against his neighbors and against his own people.” - Colin Powell, Feb 5 2003, speech to UN Security Council “Should we sit idly by with our passive containment policy and our inept covert operations, and wait until a tyrant possessing large quantities of weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated delivery strikes out at us?” - Paul Wolfowitz, current Deputy Secretary of Defense, in 1996 editorial, cited in Harper’s (Oct 2002) “Dick Cheney’s Song of America” by David Armstrong “I told all four that there were going to be some times where we don't agree with each other. But that's OK. If this were a dictatorship, it'd be a heck of a lot easier, just so long as I'm the dictator.” - President-Elect George W. Bush, Dec 18 2000, CNN transcript, discussing a meeting with congressional leaders “The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary; he is deceiving.” - G.W. Bush, Jan 28 2003 State of the Union Address “Iraq is the prototype. Saddam Hussein's regime is isolated, his conventional military power has been severely weakened, his people live in poverty and terror, and he has no useful place in international politics. He is therefore determined to develop WMD. Nothing will change until Saddam is gone, so the United States must mobilize whatever resources it can, including support from his opposition, to remove him. “ - Condoleezza Rice, current National Security Adviser, “Life after the cold war”, Foreign Affairs Magazine, Jan-Feb 2000 “We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt.” - Condoleezza Rice, Jul 29 2001, CNN Late Night with Wolf Blitzer “If a resolution is issued that respects the U.N. Charter, international law and Iraq’s sovereignty, security and independence, and does not provide a cover for America’s ill intentions, we will look into whether we will deal with it.” - Saddam Hussein, Nov 4 2002, Iraqi television U.N. Resolution 1441 “Decides… to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.” - U.N. Resolution 1441, passed unanimously by the U.N. Security Council, Nov 8 2002 “If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations this resolution does not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security." - John Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Nov 8 2002 “With the passage of this resolution the world must not lapse into unproductive debates over whether specific instances of Iraqi noncompliance are serious. Any Iraqi noncompliance is serious…. America will be making only one determination: Is Iraq meeting the terms of the Security Council resolution or not? The United States has agreed to discuss any material breach with the Security Council, but without jeopardizing our freedom of action to defend our country. If Iraq fails to fully comply, the United States and other nations will disarm Saddam Hussein.” - George W. Bush, Nov 9 2002, Press Conference “[D]emands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution….” - U.N. Resolution 1441, Nov 8 2002 “We are prepared to receive the inspectors within the assigned timetable. We are eager to see them perform their duties in accordance with international law as soon as possible." - Mohammed al-Douri, Iraq Ambassador to the U.N., Nov 14 2002 “[I]nstructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution….” - U.N. Resolution 1441, Nov 8 2002 Nov 18 2002: U.N. inspections resume in Iraq “[I]n order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems….” - U.N. Resolution 1441, Nov 8 2002 “Resolution 1441 recognized that Iraq ‘has been and remains in material breach of its obligations,’ but gave the Iraqi regime, again, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations. Iraq's answer came on December 7th in a 12,200-page document submitted to the Security Council. The declaration's title echoes the language of Resolution 1441. It is called, ‘Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration.’ But our experts have found it to be anything but currently accurate, full or complete…. Most brazenly of all, the Iraqi declaration denies the existence of any prohibited weapons programs at all.” - Colin Powell, Dec 19 2002, Press Conference “[A]n opportunity was missed in the declaration to give a lot of evidence. And well, they can still provide it and I hope they provide it to us orally, but it would have been better if it had been in the declaration.” - Hans Blix, Dec 19 2002, remarks on the Iraqi Declaration “[W]e are making good progress in having access to sites. Iraq is cooperating well in terms of process. We both, I think, agree that we still need much more cooperation from Iraq in terms of substance, in terms of uncovering of evidence, to exonerate themselves that they are clean from weapons of mass destruction.” - Mohamed El-Baradei, Dec 19 2002, remarks on the Iraqi Declaration “Decides that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by resolution 1441 (2002) unless, on or before 17 March 2003, the Council concludes that Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament obligations under resolution 1441 (2002) and previous relevant resolutions….” - Draft of Resolution submitted to U.N. Security Council by the U.S., Britain, and Spain, Mar 7 2003 “Having held discussions over the weekend and in the last few hours with other council members, we have had to conclude that council consensus will not be possible.” - Jeremy Greenstock, British Ambassador to the U.N., Mar 18 2003, discussing withdrawal of the Mar 7 2003 resolution, anticipating certain defeat “[I]f the action is to take place without the support of the Council, its legitimacy will be questioned and the support for it will be diminished.” - Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, 17 Mar 2003, Press Conference discussing U.S. advice to remove U.N. staff from Iraq WMD Estimates In Iraq Prior to the War“First, following Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait, it became clear that the Saddam Hussein government had created a range and quality of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that was truly alarming. Iraq had also acquired a very considerable long-range missile force to deliver those weapons. There was also concern about Iraq's nuclear weapons program, which through the International Atomic Energy Agency, we now know was advanced. It was for these reasons that the Security Council imposed very heavy, very strict requirements upon Iraq for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of those weapons, and all of that to be done under international supervision. Those obligations were backed up by heavy sanctions.” - Richard Butler, Executive Director of UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission), speech at Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Jan 11-12 1999 “You have to understand that when the Gulf War was ended there was revealed an awesome array of weapons of mass destruction: almost a nuclear bomb, long-range missiles, chemical, biological, all of the weapons of mass destruction. And we, with Iraq, got hold of most of it, got an account of it or got rid of it.” - Richard Butler, 1999 interview with PBS “Thanks to the work of U.N. inspectors, not much was left of Iraq's once massive weapons programs when inspections halted. The question now is how much Baghdad has managed to acquire since then.” - Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of UNSCOM (1991-1997), Sep 15 2002, Washington Post “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.” - National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Oct 2002, excerpts declassified on Jul 18 2003 “If the U.K. and the U.S. are convinced and they say they have evidence, well then one would expect that they would be able to tell us where is this stuff." - Hans Blix, Dec 20 2002, BBC Radio “No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found…. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far…. There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991…. One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January.” - Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), Mar 7 2003, statement to the UN Security Council regarding UNMOVIC’s 12th Quarterly Report “I should note that, in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its co-operation, particularly with regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern.” - Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), Mar 7 2003, report to UN Security Council Dangers of War in Iraq“At the United Nations and elsewhere, concern has been expressed about the possibility of an attack by the United States on Iraq. It is recognized that such action might harm the coalition against terror and somewhat inflame the Arab world.” - Richard Butler, Nov 28 2001, CNN interview “I think it would be better to try to keep the coalition together and to try to get consensus in the UN Security Council for action to bring Iraq back into compliance with the law, such as through reinserting arms control inspectors and renewing the world community's attempt to take away Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.” - Ibid. “I believe it is right for the United States to be determined to solve this problem. But I think it should take great care in finding a solution that doesn't make the problem worse, and that means it should be a solution that has widespread international support and doesn't find the United States going it alone.” - Ibid. "An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken," - Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser under President George H.W. Bush Sep 15 2002, Wall Street Journal editorial page “Our experience from those years proves beyond doubt that Iraq has the ambition and ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction. But it also shows that international weapons inspectors, if properly backed up by international force, can unearth Saddam Hussein's weapons programs. If we believe that Iraq would be much less of a threat without such weapons, the obvious thing is to focus on getting rid of the weapons. Doing that through an inspection team is not only the most effective way, but would cost less in lives and destruction than an invasion.” - Rolf Ekeus, Sep 15 2002, Washington Post "War has a momentum of its own and it carries you away from all thoughtful intentions when you get into it. Today, if we went into Iraq, like the president would like us to do, you know where you begin. You never know where you are going to end.” - George Kennan, chief architect of US Cold War policy, Sep 27 2002, US Dept. of State International Information Programs website “All around the globe, people want to see this crisis resolved peacefully. There is widespread concern about the long-term consequences of war in Iraq for the fight against terrorism; for the Middle East peace process; and for the world's ability to address common concerns in the future if deep divisions are sowed today between nations and between peoples of different religions…. [T]he reality is that it would cause great human suffering, whether it is long or short; that it may lead to regional instability and economic crises; and it can - as it often has before - lead to unintended consequences producing new threats and new dangers.” - Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General, Mar 10 2003, Press Conference “To those who choose to use force and think they can resolve the world’s complexity through swift and preventive action, we offer in contrast determined action over time. For today, to ensure our security, all the dimensions of the problem must be taken into account: both the manifold crises and their many facets, including cultural and religious. Nothing lasting in international relations can be built therefore without dialogue and respect for the other, without exigency and abiding by principles, especially for the democracies that must set the example. To ignore this is to run the risk of misunderstanding, radicalization and spiraling violence. This is even more true in the Middle East, an area of fractures and ancient conflicts where stability must be a major objective for us…. To those who think that the scourge of terrorism will be eradicated through the case of Iraq, we say they run the risk of failing in their objectives. The outbreak of force in this area which is so unstable can only exacerbate the tensions and fractures on which the terrorists feed.” - Dominique de Villepin, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mar 19 2003, remarks to U.N. Security Council “Germany is convinced that the United Nations and the Security Council must continue to play the central role in the Iraq conflict. This is crucial to world order and must continue to be the case in future. The UN is the key institution for the preservation of peace and stability and for the peaceful reconciliation of interests in the world of today and of tomorrow. There is no substitute for its function as a guardian of peace.” - Joschka Fischer, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mar 19 2003, remarks to U.N. Security Council Nuclear Weapons in Iraq"We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud." - Condoleezza Rice, Sep 8 2002, CNN “We don’t know whether or not [Saddam] has a nuclear weapon.” - G.W. Bush, Dec 2002, Washington Post |
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“We said Saddam Hussein did not have a nuclear weapon.” - CIA Director George Tenet, Feb 5 2004, speech at Georgetown University discussing the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMDs “After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.” - Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), Mar 7 2003, report to UN Security Council “The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) |
G.W. Bush, Jan 28 2003 State of the Union Address, by Luc Nadeau |
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| believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapons-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment.” - State/INR Alternative View of Iraq's Nuclear Program, included with Oct 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
“We now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. . . Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.” - Vice President Dick Cheney, Aug 26 2002, Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention “We do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon.” - Dick Cheney, Sep 8 2002, NBC’s Meet the Press “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” - G.W. Bush, Jan 28 2003 State of the Union Address “…[T]he claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious.” - INR's Alternative View: Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes, included with Oct 2002 National Intelligence Estimate “Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents — which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger — are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded.” - Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), Mar 7 2003, report to UN Security Council “Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed.” - Colin Powell, Feb 5 2003, addressing UN Security Council “Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.” - G.W. Bush, Jan 28 2003 State of the Union Address “In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets.” - State/INR Alternative View of Iraq's Nuclear Program, included with Oct 2002 National Intelligence Estimate “Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq’s efforts to import these aluminium tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme.” - Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), Mar 7 2003, report to UN Security Council Chemical and Biological Weapons in Iraq“Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent.” - Colin Powell, Feb 5 2003, addressing UN Security Council “Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents – much of it added in the last year.” - National Intelligence Estimate, Oct 2002 “There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons.” - Defense Intelligence Agency Operational Support Study, Sep 2002 “This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for.” - G.W. Bush, Oct 7 2002, speech in Cincinnati. “We concluded that in some of these areas, Iraq had weapons. But we said we had no specific information on the types or quantities of weapons, agent, or stockpiles at Baghdad’s disposal.” - George Tenet, Feb 5 2004, speech at Georgetown University discussing the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMDs “The Iraqis have never accounted for all of the biological weapons they admitted they had and we know they had.” - Colin Powell, Feb 5 2003, addressing UN Security Council "It just means they're not accounted for. They are known to have existed and we don't know where they are today. That is not the same thing as to say we are therefore certain they exist today." - Hans Blix, Aug 22 2003, reported in Sydney Morning Herald Iraq as an Imminent Threat“If we wait for threats to fully materialize we will have waited too long. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” - G.W. Bush, June 2002, West Point speech “The probability of him initiating an attack . . . in the foreseeable future . . . I think would be low.” - Senior CIA Official, Oct 2002, briefing on NIE with Senate Intelligence Committee “Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for making war.” - National Intelligence Estimate, Oct 2002 “Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together, constitute as grave a threat as can be imagined." - Dick Cheney, Aug 26 2002, Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention |
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Good versus Evil, by Devin Trudell |
“Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.” - G.W. Bush, Jan 28 2003, State of The Union address "No terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people than the regime of Saddam Hussein and Iraq." - Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Sep 19 2002, addressing Senate Armed Services Committee |
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| ”They [intelligence analysts] never said there was an imminent threat.” - George Tenet, Feb 5 2004, speech at Georgetown University discussing the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMDs
“Saddam Hussein is not a threat to the U.S., although the U.S., which continues its illegal bombing campaign in the no-fly zone, is a threat to Iraq. Bush's rhetoric is more about domestic politics than any real threat. The experts say that Saddam doesn't have the capacity to manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- and even if he could somehow acquire that capacity, he certainly doesn't have the capacity to deliver them.” - Denis Halliday, former head of U.N. humanitarian program in Iraq, Mar 20 2002, Salon interview Doubts About Iraq’s WMDs?“Iraq has a high-level political commitment to maintain and conceal its weapons, led by Saddam Hussein…” - Condoleezza Rice, Jan 23 2003, “We know Iraq is lying”, New York Times Op/Ed "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction." - Dick Cheney, Aug 26 2002, Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention “There is no doubt that he has chemical weapons stocks. With respect to biological weapons, we are confident that he has some stocks of those weapons, and he is probably continuing to try to develop more.” - Colin Powell, Sep 8 2002, Fox News Sunday “…[T]here can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more." - Colin Powell, Feb 5 2003, addressing UN Security Council “Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.” - G.W. Bush, Mar 17 2003, Address to the Nation on War with Iraq "It is important to underline the word estimate. Because not everything we analyze can be known to a standard of absolute proof." - George Tenet, Feb 5 2004, speech at Georgetown University discussing the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMDs “We know where they are. They are in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad.” - Donald Rumsfeld, Mar 30 2003, ABC’s “This Week With George Stephanopoulos”, discussing the whereabouts of Iraq’s WMDs ."Personally, I found it peculiar that those who wanted to take military action could - with 100 per cent certainty - know that the weapons existed, and at the same time turn out to have zero percent knowledge of where they were.” - Hans Blix, Sydney Morning Herald, Aug 7 2003 “I never believed that we’d just tumble over weapons of mass destruction in that country.” - Donald Rumsfeld, May 4 2003, Fox News Sunday
Al Qaeda Connection“We clearly know that there were in the past and have been contacts between senior Iraqi officials and members of al-Qaida going back for actually quite a long time. We know too that several of the detainees, in particular some high-ranking detainees, have said that Iraq provided some training to al-Qaida in chemical weapons development…. And there are some al-Qaida personnel who found refuge in Baghdad." - Condoleezza Rice, Sep 2002, PBS interview “Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda.” - G.W. Bush, Jan 28 2003, State of the Union Address "We do know of links between al-Qaeda and Iraq - we cannot be sure of the exact extent of those links." - British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Jan 29 2003, BBC “If we had a relationship with al-Qaeda, and we believed in that relationship, we wouldn't be ashamed to admit it.” - Saddam Hussein, Feb 4 2003, BBC “…[W]hat I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants…. the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp, and this camp is located in northeastern Iraq.” - Colin Powell, Feb 5 2003 speech to UN Security Council. “Baghdad's writ genuinely does not run there [al-Zurqawi’s camp].” - Senior British government source, as reported in The Guardian, Feb 3 2003 "Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden have explicitly opposed any kind of alliance." - Ibid. “Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam that controls this corner of Iraq.” - Colin Powell, Feb 5 2003, addressing UN Security Council "I am against Saddam Hussein. I want [Iraq] to change into an Islamic regime.” - Mullah Krekar, leader of Ansar al-Islam, Feb 3 2003, phone interview with the Guardian "His [bin Laden’s] aims are in ideological conflict with present day Iraq." - from leaked classified British Intelligence document, as reported by BBC News, 5 Feb 2003 "We have removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding.” - G.W. Bush, May 1 2003, aboard USS Abraham Lincoln, discussing the end of major combat operations in Iraq “I have not seen smoking-gun, concrete evidence about the [Iraq – al Qaeda] connection, but I think the possibility of such connections did exist.” - Colin Powell, Jan 8 2004, State Department news conference “I did see some evidence, indeed (former Iraqi deputy president) Tariq Aziz once talked to me about this personally, of great animosity between the Ba'athist regime in Baghdad and Osama bin Laden's movement. Great animosity.” - Richard Butler, Aug 22 2003, Sydney Morning Herald Fear and a 9/11 Connection“Frum said his assignment for the State of the Union last year was to extrapolate from the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks to make a case for ‘going after Iraq.’” - Maura Reynolds, Jan 21 2003, Los Angeles Times article, “‘Axis of Evil’ Rhetoric Said to Heighten Dangers,” reporting on statements in a book by former White House speechwriter, David Frum “Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans – this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes.” - G.W. Bush, Jan 28 2003, State of the Union Address August 2003, percentage of Americans who believed it was likely that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the Sep 11 2001 attacks: 69[12] January 2003, percentage of Americans who believed that most or some of the Sep 11 2001 hijackers were Iraqi: 44[13] January 2003, percentage of Americans who believed that none of the Sep 11 2001 hijackers were Iraqi: 17[13] "I think it's not surprising that people make that connection.” - Dick Cheney, Sep 2003, discussing a possible Saddam Hussein connection with the 9/11 terrorist attacks "No, we've had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th." - G.W. Bush, Sep 17 2003
Inspectors in Iraq“Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in the period 1991 to 1998.” - Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), Mar 7 2003, statement to the UN Security Council regarding UNMOVIC’s 12th Quarterly Report “Since the resumption of inspection a little over three months ago, and particularly during the three weeks since my last ordered report to the council, the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq…. I should note that in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its cooperation, particularly with regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern.” - Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), Mar 7 2003, report to UN Security Council "We gave him a chance to allow the inspectors in, and he wouldn't let them in." - G.W. Bush, July 14 2003, Oval Office
Weapons of Mass Destruction After the War Began"But make no mistake--as I said earlier--we have high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction. That is what this war was about and it is about." - Ari Fleischer, April 2003 “We've found the weapons of mass destruction. You know, we found biological laboratories.” - G.W. Bush, May 2003, interview with Polish television regarding two tractor-trailers discovered in northern Iraq June 2003, percentage of Americans who believed the U.S. had found weapons of mass destruction: 34[14] June 2003, percentage of Americans who approved of the decision to go to war (53%) who believed the U.S. had found weapons of mass destruction: 48[14] “We've found a couple of semi trailers at this point which we believe were, in fact, part of that program. Now it's not clear at this stage whether or not he used any of that to produce or whether he was simply getting ready for the next war. That, in my mind, is a serious danger in the hands of a man like Saddam Hussein, and I would deem that conclusive evidence, if you will, that he did, in fact, have programs for weapons of mass destruction." - Dick Cheney, Jan 22 2004, interview on NPR “There is no consensus within our intelligence community over whether the trailers were for that use or if they were used for the production of hydrogen." - George Tenet, Feb 5 2004, speech at Georgetown University discussing the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMDs “They are not mobile germ warfare laboratories. You could not use them for making biological weapons. They do not even look like them. They are exactly what the Iraqis said they were - facilities for the production of hydrogen gas to fill balloons." - British scientist and biological weapons expert, as reported in London Observer, Jun 15 2003 “But now that we have our own eyes on the ground, David Kay and the ISG must be allowed to complete their work and other collection efforts we have under way also must be allowed to run their course. And even then, it will be necessary to integrate all the new information with intelligence and analyses produced over the past fifteen years before we can determine the status of Iraq's WMD efforts prior to the war…. If we eventually are proven wrong—that is, that there were no weapons of mass destruction and the WMD programs were dormant or abandoned—the American people will be told the truth; we would have it no other way.” - Stu Cohen, Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction was published, Nov 28 2003, CIA press release "It turns out we were all wrong, and that is most disturbing.” - David Kay, Former Top U.S. Weapons Inspector, Jan 28 2004, CNN "If you sentence someone to death or you sentence someone to war, you'd better have some evidence. And we didn't feel there was evidence..." - Hans Blix, Mar 16 2004, NPR interview “Colin Powell's presentation to the Security Council made elaborate claims that went beyond quantity number one [the residual quantity of weapons that were generally thought to exist and was unaccounted for], in order to justify the war. Specifically he said that there are serious weapons there that could be given to terrorists and we've got to go, therefore, to invade Iraq and find those weapons. This quantity number two [the stuff that the British and the Americans pumped up for the war] may never be found, because maybe it never existed.” - Richard Butler, June 2 2003, interview on ABC radio Australia |
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“The White House created a special cell within the Pentagon to create the necessary materials to justify this war…. what I am saying is there are questions to be answered here about whether or not intelligence materials were manipulated or fabricated to give the weapons of mass destruction rationale for the invasion and occupation of Iraq.” -Ibid. "I cannot see that the action, in the way it was justified, was compatible with the UN Charter.” -Hans Blix, Sydney Morning Herald, Aug 7 2003 “The intention was to dramatise it, just as the vendors of some merchandise are trying to exaggerate the importance of what they have.” - Hans Blix, Feb 9 2004, Guardian “We thought he had weapons.” - G.W. Bush, Feb 7 2004, Meet the Press with Tim Russert |
Luc Nadeau |
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Media and the Public PerceptionOctober 2003, percentage of Americans who believed the misperceptions that either evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda have been found, weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq, or that world public opinion favored the US going to war with Iraq: 60[15] October 2003, percentage of Americans who held none of the above misperceptions who supported the war: 23[15] October 2003, percentage of Americans who held one, two, or three of the above misperceptions who supported the war, respectively: 53, 78, 86[15] October 2003, percentage of Americans who held one or more of the above misperceptions whose primary news source is Fox or CBS, respectively: 80, 71[15] October 2003, percentage of Americans who held one or more of the above misperceptions whose primary news source is print media or NPR/PBS, respectively: 47, 23[15]
Monetary Costs of Iraq WarAmount congress has approved for the current Iraq war (some of these funds are also available for military operations and reconstruction in Afghanistan): $149.6 billion[16] Number of U.S. troops in and around Iraq as of Sep 2003: 180,000[17] “We have no idea how long the war will last. We don't know to what extent there may or may not be weapons of mass destruction used. We don't have any idea whether or not there would be ethnic strife. We don't know exactly how long it would take to find weapons of mass destruction and destroy them…. [T]he idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces, I think, is far from the mark." - Donald Rumsfeld, Feb 27 2003, Pentagon News Conference, discussing the difficulty of estimating the costs of war in Iraq “The Bush administration has been decidedly vague about how much a war with Iraq might cost. When pressed, officials have said less than $50 billion. Last year, White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey caused a stir when he put the price tag at between 100 and 200 billion at best. The administration dismissed the figure, and Lindsey was soon fired.” - Jennifer Ludden, Feb 26 2003, reporting for NPR “…[T]he Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated the cost of activities related to possible military operations in Iraq…. CBO estimated that the incremental costs of deploying a force to the Persian Gulf (the costs that would be incurred above those budgeted for routine operations) would be between $9 billion and $13 billion. Prosecuting a war would cost between $6 billion and $9 billion a month--although CBO cannot estimate how long such a war is likely to last. After hostilities end, the costs to return U.S. forces to their home bases would range between $5 billion and $7 billion. Further, the incremental cost of an occupation following combat operations could vary from about $1 billion to $4 billion a month.” - Congressional Budget Office Report, Sep 30 2002 “[Iraq] can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon." - Paul Wolfowitz, Mar 27 2003, testimony to Congress "The American part of this will be $1.7 billion. We have no plans for any further-on funding for this " - Andrew S. Natsios, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, April 23 2003, discussing costs of rebuilding Iraq “The administration, which asked Congress for another $20 billion for Iraq reconstruction five months after Natsios made his assertion, has said it expects overall Iraqi reconstruction costs to be as much as $75 billion this year alone.” - Dana Milbank and Robin Wright, Mar 19 2004, Washington Post article, “Off the Mark on Cost of War, Reception by Iraqis” |
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Devin Trudell |
“The conference also stripped out my amendment to the Senate bill that would have required the General Accounting Office to conduct ongoing audits of the expenditure of taxpayer dollars for the reconstruction of Iraq.” - Senator Robert Byrd, Nov 3 2003, remarks on the $87 billion Iraq/Afghanistan package
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personnel “A combined UN and IAEA inspection force of fewer than 200 inspectors costing perhaps $80 million per year was pushed out and replaced by an invasion force of some 300,000 costing approximately $80 billion per year.” - Hans Blix, from his book, “Disarming Iraq” Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons“Chemical weapons were used by Iraq in its war against Iran (1980-88). Arguably that use had a decisive effect on the outcome: It saved Iraq from being overwhelmed by a much larger Iranian army. Furthermore, Iraq made use of chemical bombs in air raids against the Kurdish civilian population in northern Iraq. Nerve gases, such as sarin, and mustard gas immediately and painfully killed many thousands of civilians. More than 100,000 later died or were crippled by the aftereffects.” - Rolf Ekeus, Jun 29 2003, U.S. Department of State International Information Programs website “The dictator who is assembling the world's most dangerous weapons has already used them on whole villages – leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind, or disfigured. Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained – by torturing children while their parents are made to watch.” - G.W. Bush, Jan 28 2003, State of the Union Address “A review of thousands of declassified government documents and interviews with former policymakers shows that U.S. intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in shoring up Iraqi defenses against the ‘human wave’ attacks by suicidal Iranian troops. The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague.” - Michael Dobbs, Washington Post Staff Writer, Dec 30 2002, Washington Post article, “U.S. Had Key Role In Iraq Buildup”
Postwar Humanitarian Conditions“And tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country -- your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation.” - G.W. Bush, Jan 28 2003, State of the Union Address “A rapid post-war nutritional assessment carried out by UNICEF in Baghdad found that acute malnutrition or wasting, measured by a child’s weight for height, has nearly doubled from four per cent a year ago, to almost eight per cent.” - Unicef, from website www.unicef.org/infobycountry/iraq.html “The already deteriorated water and sanitation system in Iraq collapsed as a result of this latest war. In Baghdad, around 40 per cent of the network was damaged leading to loss or contamination of piped water. Sewage treatment facilities are not operating due to the breakdown of the fuel supply line, the lack of maintenance and looting.” - Ibid. “In Baghdad alone, there are an estimated 800 hazardous sites, the majority related to cluster bombs and caches of dumped ammunition. Children are injured or killed on a daily basis when touching or playing with UXOs.” - Ibid. “…[T]he administration's lack of post-war planning for Iraq is producing an erratic, chaotic situation on the ground with little hope for a quick turnaround. We appear to be lurching from one assault on our troops to the next while making little if any headway in stabilizing or improving security in the country.” - Senator Robert Byrd, Nov 3 2003, remarks on the $87 billion Iraq/Afghanistan package
Selections from Key Findings of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Report: “WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications”, Jan 2004, Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, George Perkovich, with Alexis Ortonhttp://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Iraq3FullText.pdf “Iraq’s WMD programs represented a long-term threat that could not be ignored. They did not, however, pose an immediate threat to the United States, to the region, or to global security.” “Iraq’s nuclear program had been dismantled and there was no convincing evidence of its reconstitution.” “Regarding chemical weapons, UNSCOM discovered that Iraqi nerve agents had lost most of their lethality as early as 1991. Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, and UN inspections and sanctions effectively destroyed Iraq’s large-scale chemical weapon production capabilities. For both reasons, it appears that thereafter Iraq focused on preserving a latent, dual-use capability, rather than on weapons production.” “The biological weapons program may also have been converted to dual-use facilities designed to quickly start weapons production in time of war, rather than making and storing these weapons in advance.” “The missile program appears to have been the one program in active development in 2002. Iraq was expanding its capability to build missiles whose ranges exceeded UN limits.” “It is unlikely that Iraq could have destroyed, hidden, or sent out of the country the hundreds of tons of chemical and biological weapons, dozens of Scud missiles and facilities engaged in the ongoing production of chemical and biological weapons that officials claimed were present without the United States detecting some sign of this activity before, during, or after the major combat period of the war.” “How much radioactive and biological material have been lost and whether they have fallen into the wrong hands remain crucial unknowns.” “The dramatic shift between prior intelligence assessments and the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), together with the creation of an independent intelligence entity at the Pentagon and other steps, suggest that the intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers’ views sometime in 2002.” “There was and is no solid evidence of a cooperative relationship between Saddam’s government and Al Qaeda.” “There was no evidence to support the claim that Iraq would have transferred WMD to Al Qaeda and much evidence to counter it.” “Today, the most likely source of a nuclear terrorist threat would be from theft or purchase of fissile material or tactical nuclear weapons from poorly guarded stockpiles in Russia and other former Soviet states, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, including technology and know how, is also a major concern.” “Administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq’s WMD and ballistic missile programs, beyond the intelligence failures noted above, by: -Treating nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as a single ‘WMD threat.’ The conflation of three distinct threats, very different in the danger they pose, distorted the cost/benefit analysis of the war. - Insisting without evidence—yet treating as a given truth—that Saddam Hussein would give whatever WMD he possessed to terrorists. -Routinely dropping caveats, probabilities, and expressions of uncertainty present in intelligence assessments from public statements. - Misrepresenting inspectors’ findings in ways that turned threats from minor to dire.” “The UN inspection process appears to have been much more successful than recognized before the war. Nine months of exhaustive searches by the U.S. and coalition forces suggest that inspectors were actually in the process of finding what was there. Thus, the choice was never between war and doing nothing about Iraq’s WMD.” “Considering all the costs and benefits, there were at least two options clearly preferable to a war undertaken without international support: allowing the UNMOVIC/IAEA inspections to continue until obstructed or completed, or imposing a tougher program of ‘coercive inspections’ backed by a specially designed international force.” |
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[1] Based on word count, from transcript of speech on White House website [2] From IraqBodyCount.org. The Pentagon keeps no official stats on civilian casualties. [3] CNN.com [4] Compiled from data on the Center for Defence and International Security Studies website and Luke Mitchell, “A Run on Terror”, Harper’s March 2004 [5] From Hiroshima Peace Site website [6] From Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum website [7] Human Rights Watch, Jul 1993, “Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds” [8] Nathaniel Hurd, Jul 15 2000, “U.S. Diplomatic and Commercial Relationships with Iraq, 1980 - 2 August 1990”, from the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq website. [Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug 2 1990] [9] New York Times, Mar 31 2004, “Starved for Safety”, Nicholas Kristof [10] The Nation, Mar 8 2004, “Silence = Rape”, Jan Goodwin [11] Extrapolated from R.E. Black, S.S. Morris, J. Bryce. 2003. “Where and why are 10 million children dying every year?” Lancet 361: 2226-34. [The answer to the question posed in the title is almost all in poor countries and most from preventable causes] [12] Washington Post poll, published Sep 2003 [13] Princeton Survey Research Associates poll of more than 1,200 Americans for the Knight Ridder newspaper chain, Jan 2003 [14] PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, Jun 2003 |
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| Luc Nadeau is a freelance writer in Longmont, Colorado | ||||
| Devin Trudell is a cartoonist in Seattle, Washington | ||||